

**THE FUTURE
OF
TRANSATLANTIC COOPERATION**

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In September 2004, Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC), along with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the United States Air Force, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), Sandia National Laboratories, and the Space and Missile Systems Center (SMC) jointly sponsored a conference on the subject of “The Future of Transatlantic Cooperation.” Conference participants were drawn from industry, academia, and defense establishments throughout Europe and the United States. Countries and organizations represented at the conference include Bulgaria, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Romania, Russia, Slovenia, the United Kingdom, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU).

In order to promote an atmosphere of frank and open dialogue among the participants, and in accordance with a longstanding tradition at Wilton Park, the 15th Annual SAIC-Wilton Park conference was conducted on a non-attribution basis. The author would like to thank those conference participants and speakers who made their notes available for the preparation of this report. The opinions expressed in this report are those of the author and do not reflect the views of Science Applications International Corporation or any of the other sponsoring organizations.

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FOREWORD

Since 1989, the SAIC Wilton Park conference has provided a forum for government officials, academics, and other members of the transatlantic community to meet and engage in informal and constructive dialogue about the key issues confronting the transatlantic partners. This report is based on the presentations and discussions at the 15th annual SAIC Wilton Park conference on the subject of “The Future of Transatlantic Cooperation.” The conference took place from 20-24 September 2004 in Wiston House at the Wilton Park Conference Center in West Sussex, England. Conference participants engaged in wide-ranging discussions of a variety of issues, including: transatlantic cooperation in ongoing operations in Afghanistan and Iraq; transatlantic cooperation in other areas of the global War on Terror, to include combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; institutional change within both NATO and the EU and the implications for transatlantic cooperation; and finally, the challenges and opportunities for transatlantic cooperation in the strategically vital area of space technology. This report is organized around these issues and relies primarily on the vigorous and rewarding discussions that took place during the conference. This report also attempts to provide the necessary background for the conference discussions and the author has therefore made use of additional research materials to provide historical context and supplementary detail.

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I. INTRODUCTION

The transatlantic relationship is currently experiencing a period of significant tension and substantial transformation. The terrorist attacks of September 11th 2001 and, perhaps more significantly, the international reaction to the US military response to the attacks have impacted the transatlantic relationship in dramatic fashion. The conflict in Afghanistan demonstrated the possibilities of transatlantic cooperation, while the conflict in Iraq caused an unprecedented degree of transatlantic tension while also revealing deep fissures within the European community. Institutional changes within both the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU) concurrent with the significant expansion of both institutions have changed the internal dynamics of both organizations in ways that significantly influence the conduct of transatlantic affairs.

This is not the first time the transatlantic relationship has experienced such a period of tumult and transformation. Fifteen years ago, the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union ushered in a period of dynamic change. When the threat of a Soviet invasion of Western Europe disappeared, so did the founding rationale for NATO, the institutional pillar and symbol of the transatlantic alliance. Many on both sides of the Atlantic questioned the continued relevance of a fifty-year old defensive military alliance intended to counter a threat that no longer existed.

During the 1990s, however, the transatlantic partners worked together to resolve a number of challenges and international crises. During the Gulf War (1991) a number of European countries joined the United States in a non-NATO military campaign to force Saddam Hussein to withdraw from Kuwait. Europe and the United States also worked together to end a series of conflicts in the Balkans and to execute peacekeeping operations in the troubled region. NATO played a particularly important role in these efforts, launching the first offensive combat operation in the history of the Alliance (1995) in an attempt to force the Bosnian Serbs to the negotiating table, and subsequently deploying an Implementation Force (IFOR) of 60,000 troops to the Balkans to oversee a negotiated ceasefire. In 1999, NATO forces launched an 11-week air campaign against

the forces of Serbian president Slobodan Milosevic to halt the carnage taking place in the province of Kosovo. These and other efforts can be seen as initial attempts by the members of the transatlantic alliance to assume new missions and responsibilities and to establish a new *raison d'être*. During the 1990s, the transatlantic alliance embarked upon the first steps of an evolution away from its origins as an organization for collective defense and towards a new incarnation as a collective security organization.

The 1990s also witnessed the continuation of a long process of European economic and political integration. In 1992, the representatives of twelve European countries met at Maastricht and signed the Treaty on European Union.¹ The treaty created ambitious goals for the member states of the new European Union (EU), including monetary union, European citizenship and the establishment of a common foreign and security policy. The creation of the EU inserted another dynamic into the transatlantic relationship as the new organization was seen by some as a potential rival to NATO and as a competitor for the limited military and financial resources previously allocated only to the Atlantic Alliance.

The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 represent a milestone in the history of the transatlantic relationship. The immediate aftermath of the attacks saw all the European capitals issuing declarations of solidarity with the United States. NATO invoked Article Five of its charter, a previously unused mutual defense clause that treated an attack on one Alliance member as an attack on all members. NATO dispatched air surveillance assets to assist with air defense over the continental United States, directed NATO forces in the Balkans to act against terrorist groups with links to Al-Qaeda, and used NATO assets to monitor shipping in the eastern Mediterranean.

On 7 October 2001, the United States launched Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) aimed at toppling the Taliban regime and destroying the terrorist infrastructure in Afghanistan. Although the United States did not request official NATO assistance for the

¹ The twelve signatory nations were: Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain. Austria, Finland, and Sweden joined the EU on 1 January 1995.

military campaign, individual NATO member countries provided significant support in the form of naval and air assets. By early spring of 2002, the Taliban had been removed from power and the Al Qaeda network in Afghanistan effectively destroyed. In August 2003, NATO assumed command of the UN-mandated International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, comprising a force of 6,500 soldiers drawn primarily from NATO member countries. The ISAF mission is another significant milestone in the evolution of NATO, for while the IFOR mission in Bosnia marked NATO's first "out of area" mission, the NATO ISAF mission in Afghanistan marked the first "out of continent" mission for the Atlantic Alliance.

The atmosphere of consensus and cooperation that characterized transatlantic relations with regard to OEF stands in marked contrast to the acrimony that has developed from the most recent US initiative in the global War on Terror: Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). Every phase of OIF, from the first diplomatic initiatives to the stability and support operations that followed the end of major combat operations, proved to be a source of major tension among the transatlantic partners. This tension reached crisis proportions when transatlantic differences caused a delay in responding to Turkey's request for assistance to deter a potential attack by the forces of Saddam Hussein, prompting the US Ambassador to NATO Nicholas Burns to speak of NATO's "near-death" experience.² The embittered atmosphere prompted many other observers to question the very future of transatlantic relations.

Against a backdrop now dominated by a difficult insurgency in Iraq and successful elections in Afghanistan, the last twelve months have seen a number of particularly significant developments that will influence the transatlantic relationship. On 29 March 2004, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia joined NATO, making it the largest expansion in the 55-year history of the Alliance. In May 2004, the EU admitted ten new member states (Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, the Slovak Republic, and Slovenia) bringing

² See, for example, his op-ed piece, "NATO has adapted: An alliance with a new mission," *International Herald Tribune* (24 May 2003).

nearly 100 million people into the Union and forming the biggest trading bloc in the world. In June 2004, NATO heads of state met in Istanbul, Turkey, where, among other things, they agreed to expand NATO's presence in Afghanistan, to assist the new government of Iraq with the training of its security forces, to adopt measures aimed at improving NATO's operational capabilities, and to continue to support non-proliferation and counterterrorism initiatives. That same month, after several years of discussions, the EU leaders finally reached political agreement on a draft EU Constitution. Finally, in August 2004, the five-nation Eurocorps took command of ISAF while, in October, the NATO Response Force (NRF) attained initial operational capability.

The events of the last twelve months promise to have a significant and lasting impact on the transatlantic relationship. At the end of such a dynamic period of transatlantic tumult and transformation, it is appropriate and useful to survey the current state of affairs and to present some observations about the future of transatlantic cooperation.

II. TRANSATLANTIC COOPERATION IN AFGHANISTAN AND IRAQ

Afghanistan (Operation Enduring Freedom and the International Security Assistance Force)

Transatlantic contributions in Afghanistan can be divided into two categories: those that support the US-led military operation (Operation Enduring Freedom) targeting the remaining terrorist and Taliban forces, and those that support the ongoing stability and support operations undertaken by the UN-mandated International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). Transatlantic cooperation in the early stages of OEF was considerable and the contributions of several European countries to the military operations were substantial. In 2002, for example, no less than 14 NATO member countries had forces deployed in the region and nine of these countries had forces actively involved in combat operations as part of OEF. French military contributions were particularly important and included marines, army mountain forces, land-based strike aircraft, and a carrier battle group. French contributions to the air war exceeded those of the United Kingdom, and France was the first country, aside from the US, to perform bombing missions in support of US troops on the ground. In 2002, France ranked as the largest single military contributor to OEF.³ German contributions to OEF included Army, Air Force and Navy contingents, while the United Kingdom launched Tomahawk cruise missiles, inserted Special Forces, provided aerial and naval support, and deployed thousands of additional soldiers. A number of smaller NATO countries also provided support in a variety of forms. In sum, European contributions to Operation Enduring Freedom were both genuine and significant.

Transatlantic cooperation continued following the collapse of the Taliban regime and the destruction of the terrorist training camps. An International Security Assistance Force

³ "NATO: Coalition Contributions to the War on Terrorism," Fact Sheet, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, US Department of State (October 31, 2002).

(ISAF) was established in accordance with the Bonn Agreement of 6 December 2001. ISAF deployed in January 2002 with a mandate to provide a safe and secure environment in order to facilitate the reconstruction of Afghanistan. For the first two years of its existence, command of ISAF was given to the United Kingdom (December 2001 to June 2002), Turkey (June 2002 to February 2003) and Germany and the Netherlands (February 2003 to August 2003). On 11 August 2003, command of ISAF passed to NATO, marking the first “out of area” mission for NATO and marking a significant milestone in the history of the Atlantic Alliance. ISAF’s mandate, however, was initially limited to providing security assistance to Kabul and its immediate environs. This limitation was addressed with the establishment of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), comprising a combination of international military and civilian personnel and based outside of Kabul.

The PRTs are intended to extend the authority of the Afghan central government, to contribute to an improved security environment, and to facilitate development and reconstruction efforts. In early 2003, US-led PRTs established themselves across Afghanistan in Gardez, Bamian and Kunduz. Other US-led PRTs quickly followed and, as of the fall of 2004, a total of 19 PRTs had been established. All of these initial US-led PRTs operated as part of Operation Enduring Freedom and under US command. On 13 October 2003, however, the UN Security Council expanded the ISAF mandate to encompass areas outside Kabul. The new mandate included the establishment of NATO-led PRTs. On 30 December 2003, a pilot NATO PRT was established in Kunduz and placed under German command. Four additional NATO PRTs were subsequently established in Maimana (United Kingdom), Mazar-e-Sharif (United Kingdom), Feyzabad (Germany) and Pul-I-Komri (Netherlands).

While the establishment of ISAF and of five NATO-led PRTs in Afghanistan is certainly a contribution towards an effective transatlantic approach to securing the stability and security of post-Taliban Afghanistan, a number of issues and challenges cast doubt upon the extent of European commitment and resolve. The first problem stems from the geography of the country: Afghanistan is a large country and the nature of the terrain makes the establishment of effective political control a difficult proposition. In such an

environment, the establishment of 5 NATO PRTs in the northern regions of the country is not necessarily a sign of European commitment. Plans are currently underway, however, to expand ISAF's jurisdiction westward by establishing new PRTs and incorporating existing PRTs currently operating as part of Operation Enduring Freedom.

Coordinating the forces of many different countries and reconciling their varied operational strategies and attitudes has also been a source of confusion. This confusion is compounded by the fact that the ISAF PRTs and the coalition units participating in OEF are running concurrent operations and sometimes take conflicting approaches to particular problems. In one instance, for example, when a German-led PRT proved reluctant to take strong action against a local warlord, US and UK forces operating as part of OEF intervened. This action raises a number of questions over mission definition and inter-force cooperation.

Finally, the transatlantic effort in Afghanistan is also plagued by one of NATO's perennial problems: the reluctance of member states to make the necessary military and financial commitments. While a number of NATO countries have announced their willingness to assist with the efforts currently underway in Afghanistan, they have failed to follow through with the necessary resources.

The effectiveness of transatlantic cooperation in Afghanistan is impacted not only by the lack of conceptual clarity and the paucity of resources mentioned above. It is also hampered by a number of economic and social factors currently prevailing in the environment of Afghanistan. The fragmentation of authority revealed by the enduring power and influence of local warlords has proven to be a persistent and dangerous problem. Compounding the problem, many of these warlords fund their personal fiefdoms through the production and sale of opium. The U.K.-led program to reduce opium production has thus far had little effect and opium production has actually increased. The situation has deteriorated to such an extent that Afghan president Hamid Karzai has suggested that it might take nearly a decade before the problem of opium production is brought under control.

There are currently more than 20,000 non-US troops on the ground in Afghanistan, including many contributed by the smaller European countries, and the experience with ISAF and the NATO PRTs have made Afghanistan an instructive laboratory for the study of transatlantic cooperation. Although important questions remain with regard to burden sharing, resource commitment, and mission definition, transatlantic cooperation in Afghanistan has generally proven effective. Perhaps more importantly, and in contrast to other recent undertakings, the transatlantic partnership in Afghanistan rests on a firm foundation of goodwill and a shared interest in ensuring the stability of the region. However, the ongoing effort is one filled with challenges. The remarkable progress demonstrated by the success of Afghanistan's first democratic elections should not obscure the fact that great risks remain. The stakes for all parties remain high, perhaps higher even than before the elections. Transatlantic cooperation has done much to place Afghanistan on the road to a promising future and the transatlantic partners must ensure that the journey continues.

Iraq (Operation Iraqi Freedom)

The atmosphere of goodwill that characterizes much of the transatlantic relationship with regard to Afghanistan is notably absent when the subject turns to Iraq. The US decision to invade Iraq and topple the regime of Saddam Hussein created enormous strains in the transatlantic relationship, most clearly demonstrated in the sharp deterioration of relations between the US, France, and Germany. The subsequent course of events in Iraq, particularly the failure to find weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and the challenges of a growing insurgency, did little to ease transatlantic tensions in the weeks and months immediately following the invasion.

With transatlantic disagreements being played out so publicly in the media, it is easy to overstate the extent of transatlantic discord. As was discovered in the run up to the war, a significant number of European countries supported the US decision to invade Iraq and topple the regime of Saddam Hussein. Spain, Italy, and, of course, the United Kingdom, all supported the war despite great public opposition, as did several Eastern European and Baltic countries such as Poland, Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria, Estonia and Latvia.

Although quite dramatic, the intra-European divisions are not necessarily surprising. At the time when many of the European countries announced their support for the US position on Iraq, many were on the verge of becoming new members of NATO. Although at the time, NATO had no intentions of becoming involved in Iraq, the new members likely saw this as a first test of their ability to contribute to the Atlantic Alliance as well as to earn the goodwill of the United States, the most influential NATO member. Perhaps more important, many of these new NATO members had just recently emerged from the shadows of Eastern European dictatorships. Their recent experience with oppression made them more receptive to the idea, and to the necessity, of removing the dictatorial regime of Saddam Hussein. Unlike other European countries, the governments of much of “New Europe” shared with the United States a common perception of the threat posed by Hussein’s regime as well as a belief in the moral justification for action.

Although this solidarity has been welcomed by the United States, it has not truly translated into greater burden sharing on the ground. European contributions to operations in Iraq (with the notable exception of the contributions of the United Kingdom) have been relatively minimal and the new NATO members have difficulty finding sufficient forces that can be equipped and deployed for action in Iraq.

At the NATO Istanbul Summit of 28 June 2004, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) agreed to provide assistance with the training of Iraqi security forces. Many of the details, and particularly those relating to the command structure, remain to be worked out and some argue that the idea represents a token gesture and will result in little of substance. Nevertheless, the decision taken at Istanbul represents an important milestone with regard to NATO involvement in Iraq and has opened the door to discussion of possible additional roles for NATO in Iraq, such as assisting with providing security for the upcoming elections, protecting United Nations personnel, and providing technical support in a number of other areas.

The debate over Iraq has produced a serious crisis in both transatlantic and inter-European relations. Although a comprehensive transatlantic strategy for dealing with

Iraq remains elusive, the Alliance has likely emerged from its most challenging period, for even if many of the transatlantic partners continue to disagree over the rationale behind the invasion of Iraq, it is in no one's interest to see the country collapse into chaos and civil war. There are some encouraging early signs of a growing willingness among European opponents of the war to play a greater role in the stabilization and reconstruction of Iraq, but the path ahead for the transatlantic partners will depend in large part on the success and the aftermath of the upcoming Iraqi elections.

III. TRANSATLANTIC COOPERATION ON NON-PROLIFERATION

The terrorist attacks of 9/11 resulted in a renewed focus on the threat posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). While Europe and the US share a common view of the WMD threat, significant differences remain with regard to the preferred approaches to the problem of WMD proliferation.

The European Union

In the past year, the EU has developed a set of policies and procedures to deal with the proliferation of WMD. On 20 June 2003, the EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solana, presented a paper to a European Council meeting at Thessalonika, entitled “A Secure Europe in a Better World.” In this paper, Solana identified three major threats facing the EU: terrorism, the nexus of failed states and organized crime, and the proliferation of WMD. Of the three, Solana identified the proliferation of WMD as “potentially the greatest threat to EU security.” Solana’s paper (later formally adopted as the “EU Security Strategy”) was supplemented by a document entitled “Basic Principles for an EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction” (2003). Agreed to at a meeting of the European Council on 12 December 2003, this document built upon previous discussions and outlined a strategy that included the establishment of a monitoring center to collect relevant information and intelligence. Javier Solana has also appointed a Personal Representative for the Nonproliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction to coordinate, implement, and further develop the EU strategy against the proliferation of WMD. In addition to developing its own proliferation policy, the EU has sought closer cooperation with the United States on this issue. Several EU countries have participated in the US-sponsored Proliferation Security Initiative, including France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom.

Finally, it should be noted that the WMD policy of the EU is still in its early, formative stages (as is the EU Security Strategy of which it forms a part) and the agencies charged

with executing this policy continue to struggle with budgetary constraints that limit their influence and effectiveness.

NATO

For much of its history, NATO has resisted efforts to develop its own set of nonproliferation policies, preferring instead to encourage NATO member countries to participate and comply with already-existing treaties and accords. Nevertheless, NATO has undertaken a number of initiatives that support the nonproliferation mission. In May 2000, NATO established a Weapons of Mass Destruction Center intended, among other things, to improve information sharing among the NATO allies on proliferation issues, to counter WMD threats, and to facilitate cooperation among NATO allies. The attacks of 9/11 reinforced the importance of such initiatives and the communiqué issued after the Istanbul summit of June 2004 reflects a renewed emphasis on issues relating to WMD proliferation, including several strong statements in support of various arms control and nonproliferation initiatives such as the Proliferation Security Initiative.

Iran

The most pressing proliferation issue facing the transatlantic community is the threat posed by Iran's desire to develop a military nuclear capability. The transatlantic approach to this problem contrasts the hard-line approach of the US characterized by confrontation, sanctions, and the threat of military action, with the "softer" policy of engagement and diplomacy exemplified by the initiatives of the so-called EU3: France, Britain, and Germany.

Advocates for the policy of engagement wonder whether we are giving Iran enough time and argue that the public manner in which the negotiations are taking place are hampering any effort at reaching a real agreement. Heated rhetoric and threats by the US, for example, threaten to back Iran into a corner from which it cannot escape, and could perhaps prompt it to take dramatic action, such as withdrawing from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Others fail to see why the US cannot approach the problem

of a nuclear-armed Iran using a strategy of containment similar to that which had proven so successful against a nuclear-armed Soviet Union.

Those who argue for a firmer stand, however, suggest that the current state of affairs vis-à-vis Iran's nuclear ambitions are much more dismal and dangerous than they have ever been. They lament the lack of a sense of urgency and point out that the confrontation between the US and Iran is rapidly approaching a crisis point in which escalation is probable.

Neither the diplomatic approach of the EU nor the hard-line approach of the US has produced the desired result, and Iran continues to move forward with her nuclear programs. At the same time, transatlantic cooperation on this critical issue has been somewhat hindered by the atmosphere of mutual distrust that resulted from the disagreements over Iraq.

Russia

Any attempt to deal with issues of proliferation must consider the unique position of Russia. This country is less than two decades removed from its position as the nuclear-armed rival to the US in the bipolar conflict that was the Cold War. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the old US-Soviet strategic arms control agreements have been allowed to expire. The US withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty in December 2001, created scarcely a ripple in Russia because arms control was no longer the centerpiece of the US – Russia relationship. The relative strength of the two former adversaries has become so assymetric that neither Russia nor the United States have any real interest in pursuing strategic arms control initiatives.

Although Russia no longer has a need for arms control agreements, they do have an interest in enforcing non-proliferation initiatives. The ongoing conflict in Chechnya and the stated desire of Chechen terrorists to obtain WMD, and their demonstrated ability to carry out mass casualty attacks have made Russia particularly sensitive to the perils of proliferation.

At the same time, however, Russia herself is seen as a potential source of WMD proliferation. Before its collapse in 1991, the Soviet Union had more than 27,000 nuclear weapons and large stockpiles of weapons-grade plutonium and uranium. The chaos that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union, including severe economic distress, rampant crime, and widespread corruption, have created great concern about the security of Russian nuclear stockpile and the smuggling of nuclear materials. In addition, Russia continues to support Iran's attempts to develop a civilian nuclear capability, an activity that has raised concerns among all the transatlantic partners. Engaging with Russia on questions of proliferation will be an important task for future transatlantic cooperation.

In sum, the record of transatlantic cooperation on the issue of WMD non-proliferation is a mixed one. The non-proliferation regimes developed by existing institutions such as the EU and NATO are limited at best, although there have been some promising developments in recent months. Transatlantic cooperation with regard to Iran has been hindered by a fundamental disagreement about how best to approach the problem. The Europeans evidence a desire to achieve Iranian compliance through diplomacy and political dialogue, while the United States appears to prefer the threat of economic sanctions and the use of military force. It appears that the final resolution will embrace a combination of these two approaches. But it is imperative that all parties act quickly to ease the crisis, for continued delay could have catastrophic consequences.

IV. NATO AND THE EU: INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE TRANSATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP

In 2004, NATO admitted seven new members to the alliance, expanding the number of member countries from 19 to 26. The EU is also experiencing a period of dramatic change and expansion. In May 2004, ten new countries joined the ranks of the EU and efforts are currently underway to expand EU military capabilities. Both organizations also face contentious decisions about further expansion in the near future: NATO is looking at the possibility of admitting Ukraine, while the EU is considering offering membership to Turkey. Both organizations are also going through processes that are changing the way in which they think about themselves: NATO is transitioning away from its Cold War identity as an organization of collective defense and towards an organization of collective security more appropriate for the global threats of today; the twenty-five leaders of the newly-expanded EU have recently signed a new constitution to govern relations among the EU members and to provide an increased sense of cohesion within the European bloc. Finally, both organizations are crafting new security strategies, developing new capabilities, and undertaking new missions. Such significant developments within both NATO and the EU will have a significant impact on the character and dynamics of the transatlantic partnership.

NATO

On 29 March 2004, seven countries (Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia) formally became members of NATO. This latest round of enlargement, the second since the end of the Cold War and the fifth since the Alliance was established in 1949, is the largest expansion in NATO history and represents the addition of more than 45 million European citizens to NATO's security responsibilities.

The seven new members are all former Central and Eastern European Communist countries and while their military contributions are of necessity somewhat limited (at least relative to those of other longstanding members of the Alliance) their influence on

the internal political dynamics of the alliance is likely to be profound. This is perhaps best illustrated by observing the number of new NATO member countries supported the US action in Iraq.

In addition to this recent past expansion, NATO is also looking over the horizon and preparing for future rounds of expansion. The most likely near-term candidate for NATO membership is Ukraine. The NATO-Ukraine relationship dates back more than a decade to 1991, when Ukraine joined the North Atlantic Cooperation Council. In 1994, Ukraine became the first member of the Commonwealth of Independent States to join NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP) program. Since this time, NATO and Ukraine have broadened and deepened their relationship through continued cooperation in a number of areas, including peacekeeping operations and military reform. Many US observers believe that NATO membership for Ukraine is inevitable. However, there is no broad consensus in Western Europe for the initiative, perhaps as a result of Russian opposition. Russia views any NATO expansion with deep suspicion and is particularly alarmed by the prospect of NATO membership for Ukraine, a country that Russia considers as belonging to its "sphere of influence." Consequently, the advantages of extending NATO membership to Ukraine will have to be weighed against the likely repercussions to the NATO-Russia relationship.

In addition to expanding its membership, NATO has also undertaken a number of initiatives aimed at reforming existing structures and developing new capabilities more appropriate to the challenges of the new, post-9/11 strategic environment. Many of these new capabilities were outlined at the NATO Istanbul summit in June 2004. In October 2004, for example, the NATO Response Force (NRF) achieved initial operational capability. The NRF is an elite force of 17,000 troops that includes land, sea, and air units. When the NRF achieves full operational capability (October 2006) it will number approximately 21,000 troops and be capable of deploying anywhere on the globe within five days. In addition, NATO has also created a new multinational chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) battalion, led by the Czech Republic. This force is intended to respond rapidly, either independently or as part of a NATO force such as the

NRF, to any CBRN attack. The CBRN battalion achieved initial operational capability in December 2003.

NATO has also initiated significant changes in its command structures. The Allied Command Transformation has been established with the goal to transform NATO's military capabilities and prepare, support and sustain Alliance operations. NATO is also moving forward with the Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) concept. Both the ACT and the CJTF initiatives will enhance transatlantic communication and transatlantic cooperation with regard to the deployment of NATO forces.

NATO's strategic concepts have evolved in significant ways as well. The question about whether NATO could, or should, undertake missions beyond the geographical bounds of Europe, for example, has been answered in Afghanistan. NATO's strategic priorities, like those of the United States, are changing as well. The recent announcement of the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, and a growing enthusiasm to revisit the Mediterranean Dialogue, demonstrate that NATO hopes to shift more of its attention southwards and to become more engaged with the Arab and Muslim states of the southern Mediterranean and the Middle East.

Despite advances in these and other areas, NATO continues to face some serious challenges. Deployability continues to be a cause for major concern. The scale of the problem is indicated by the fact that NATO currently has just four oversized aircraft under its direct control, as compared with 250 for the United States. Similarly, burden sharing among the allies continues to be a problem. The United States must convince European member states to make more resources available to support NATO and encourage them to develop more effective and deployable forces.

In the last two or three years, there has been more constructive change in NATO capabilities and its strategic mindset than at any other time in the history of the Alliance. The latest round of enlargement brought seven new countries into NATO, extending the NATO security umbrella to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. At the same time, the Alliance is developing new capabilities and new strategic priorities that will increase its effectiveness in the new strategic environment of the global War on Terror. Throughout

this period, NATO has demonstrated that it continues to be an effective forum for transatlantic cooperation and transatlantic communication.

The European Union

Like NATO, the EU has just experienced a significant period of expansion. In April 2003, ten new states (Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia) joined the EU. Also like NATO, EU expansion promises to have a profound effect on the internal dynamics of the organization as the events of the last several years, and the Iraq war in particular, have demonstrated that EU members states are often not of one mind when it comes to questions of defense, security, and transatlantic cooperation.

Also like NATO, the EU is facing a number of challenging issues regarding future expansion. There are currently three remaining candidate countries: Bulgaria, Romania, and Turkey. Of these, Bulgaria and Romania hope to join by 2007. EU membership for Turkey, however, remains a contentious issue. In December 2004, the EU will begin discussions on the issue of EU membership for Turkey. The issue has been hotly debated both in Brussels and in the EU member states, with the majority of EU heads of state supporting Turkey's bid, but in many cases facing strong opposition from their publics. The consequences of any decision will be felt not just within Europe. As a NATO member, and as a country that culturally, politically, and geographically, represents a bridge between Europe and the Middle East, the decision on EU membership for Turkey will have a significant impact on the transatlantic relationship and on larger questions of US policy.

For the last several years, the most dominant item on the EU agenda (at least within policy circles if not in the mind of European publics) has been the search for a common European policy on foreign and security affairs (embodied in the Common Foreign and Security Policy [CFSP] and the European Security and Defense Policy [ESDP]). The CFSP and the ESDP very much remain works in progress, hindered by a lack of financial

resources and the difficulties inherent in obtaining policy agreement among so many member states.

The idea of a common ESDP, and specifically, the establishment of European-specific defense institutions, has been the source of considerable transatlantic disagreement. Some hope to see EU defense institutions act as a counterweight to NATO and to the preponderance of US influence associated in the Atlantic Alliance. Advocates of this approach seek to develop planning, operational, and technological capabilities that duplicate those possessed by NATO. Opponents of such a perception argue that it is wasteful and needlessly provocative to seek such duplicative capabilities. Rather, the EU and NATO should seek a cooperative military relationship, one characterized by complementary capabilities. Some have suggested that a “division of labor” be arranged, wherein NATO would have responsibility for traditional military operations, while a European force would handle post-conflict stabilization and peacekeeping operations. All of these issues are currently being debated, both within Europe and across the Atlantic. Determining the precise roles, missions and capabilities of an EU military force is one of the key issues that lies at the heart of the transatlantic relationship.

It should be noted that even if some significant issues concerning the military relationship between NATO and the EU remain unresolved, this has not stopped the EU from moving forward on the path towards a CFSP and ESDP. The new EU constitution, for example, introduced the concept of an EU minister of foreign affairs. Similarly, they have moved forward with a number of initiatives such as EU Battle Groups, the launch of a European Defence Agency, and the EU Rapid Reaction Force.

The EU has also undertaken a number of missions, including a small military mission in Macedonia that used NATO assets, and a more substantial peacekeeping operation in Congo. This operation (Operation Artemis) was undertaken at the request of the United Nations and relied upon French planning and command structures, with no links to NATO. The EU is also poised to assume command of the NATO-led Stabilization Force (SFOR) in the Balkans.

Both NATO and the EU are experiencing periods of significant change that will affect the future of transatlantic cooperation. Both the EU and NATO have expanded dramatically and, as a result, it will likely be increasingly difficult to achieve internal consensus in decision-making. Relations between the EU and NATO have been tense at times, largely the result of differing visions of the EU's military role relative to that of NATO. The path ahead is not yet clearly defined. However, if these different visions can be reconciled, there is no doubt that enhanced NATO-EU collaboration on military matters can serve as a valuable channel of transatlantic cooperation.

V. TRANSATLANTIC COOPERATION IN THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR

The global War on Terror is not limited to the current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The deadly terrorist attacks in Madrid and Istanbul, and persistent threats against the United Kingdom, Italy, and other European countries demonstrate the need for a unified, transatlantic approach to counter the terrorist threat. There is broad agreement on the gravity of the threat, and any talk of a “threat perception gap” is certainly misplaced. On the other hand, there persist areas of disagreement as to the best approach to take to counter the threat. To oversimplify, the essence of this disagreement is that the US tends to view the conflict as a genuine war that can be won or lost. Europeans, on the other hand, tend to view the problem as one of managing a long-term threat. As a result, the US is perhaps more inclined to resort to military force when faced with a current or potential terrorist threat, while many European governments have adopted the view that the terrorist threat is best handled by traditional law enforcement activities and intelligence sharing. An obvious consequence of this difference of opinion is that when the US categorizes the war in Iraq as an integral part of the war against terrorism, it greatly complicates the transatlantic dialogue.

NATO and the EU

For the first fifty years of its existence, NATO possessed no clear and substantial strategy for addressing the problem of terrorism. At the Washington Summit of 1999, for example, NATO attention to terrorism was limited to a brief declaration that “[t]errorism constitutes a serious threat to peace security, and stability.” Similarly, NATO’s revised Strategic Concept makes only a passing reference to terrorism: “Alliance security interests can be affected by other risks of a wider nature, including acts of terrorism, sabotage, and organized crime.” Until recently, it seems clear that terrorism was not an issue of major concern for NATO.

This changed with the attacks of 11 September 2001. In the immediate aftermath of the attacks, NATO invoked the mutual defense clause of the Washington Treaty, dispatched air surveillance assets to supplement the air defense network over the United States, used NATO naval assets to monitor shipping in the eastern Mediterranean, and directed NATO forces in the Balkans to act against terrorist groups with links to Al-Qaeda. At the NATO Prague summit in November 2002, the issue of terrorism loomed much larger. At this summit, the NATO heads of state endorsed a military concept for the defense against terrorism and called for increased intelligence sharing and crisis response capabilities. The communiqué issued after the most recent NATO summit at Istanbul, in June 2004, contains a strong denunciation of terrorism and a much more substantial blueprint for action. The communiqué states that “terrorism . . . poses a grave and growing threat to Alliance populations, forces, and territory, as well as international security” and that NATO’s approach to terrorism will continue to be “multi-faceted and comprehensive, including political, diplomatic, economic and, where necessary, military means.” Significantly, the communiqué also notes that NATO “provides an essential transatlantic dimension to the response against terrorism, which requires the closest possible cooperation of North America and Europe.” The Istanbul communiqué also lays out a series of measures intended to enhance NATO’s ability to wage the War on Terror, including improved intelligence sharing among the member states, improved consequence management capabilities, deployment of NATO Airborne Early Warning and Control Aircraft (AWACs) to assist with the protection of major events; and the development of new, advanced technologies.

As with NATO, the attacks of 11 September 2001 prompted a number of new initiatives within the EU. The terrorist attacks in Madrid on 11 March 2004 had a similar effect. These include the appointment of a counterterrorism “czar”, intelligence reform, and the development of a variety of new judicial instruments aimed at expediting terrorism-related judicial processes. In addition, both the US and the EU recognize that transatlantic cooperation is essential in the global fight against terrorism and a number of transatlantic agreements on the subject have been signed. These include two Europol agreements and an Extradition and Mutual Legal Assistance Agreement. The US and EU

also share intelligence and work jointly to shut down terrorist financing. As Dr. Javier Solana recently pointed out, "Deeds matter more than words, and deeds on the transatlantic level have been swift and decisive, even when we had strong divergences over Iraq."⁴

The Media and the War on Terror

The media, in all its forms, is playing a pivotal role in the global War on Terror. The terrorists are using the media as a particularly brutal form of communication, recording and distributing shocking videos of beheadings, bombings and the civilian casualties of military action. The terrorists also know that footage of their most spectacular attacks, such as those of 11 September 2001 in New York and Washington, or those of 11 March 2004 in Madrid, will saturate the Western media for days and provide them with billions of dollars worth of free advertising. There is evidence that an increasing number of these videos are being professionally produced, showing that the terrorists are well aware of the media's effectiveness as both a tool of war and as a recruiting instrument. The media saturation characteristic of Western cultures ensures that such violent recordings will reach the widest possible audience. At the same time, the democratic nature of most Western societies gives that same audience significant political power and the terrorists hope that if public opinion, both at home and abroad, can be turned against the war then the targeted governments will be forced to change their policies. Unfortunately, in at least one case, the terrorists have been proven right.

Thus far, however, the countries targeted by the terrorists have not been able to deprive them of the media spotlight. While some suggest that the logic of war must prevail and that media blackouts should be applied and enforced, others argue that in democratic societies such government regulation of the media is neither desirable nor realistic. For the moment, it appears that the only recourse is to hope that the main media outlets will

⁴ "Terrorism in Europe: How does the Union of 25 respond to this phenomenon?" Remarks by Dr Javier Solana delivered in Berlin, 7 October 2004.

exercise caution and self-restraint when they make decisions about the airing of such videos.

It should be pointed out that the media is not just serving as a tool in the hands of the terrorists. Domestically, governments rely on the media as the most effective means to raise public awareness of potential threats. Internationally, the media is used as an instrument of public diplomacy to reach out to Arab and Muslim cultures in an attempt to win hearts and minds. Most efforts at public diplomacy thus far, however, have been under funded and ineffective, while opportunities for transatlantic cooperation in this realm remain largely unexplored. This is unfortunate and worrisome, for the war of ideas is an important and vital front in the current struggle against global terrorism. Until the West commits the necessary resources on this strategic front, and learns how to enlist the media more effectively in the war of ideas, it will be difficult and perhaps impossible to achieve lasting success in the war on terrorism.

VI. THE FRONTIER OF SPACE: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR TRANSATLANTIC COOPERATION

In recent years, space has become an area of both cooperation and competition among the transatlantic partners. The recent signing of a GPS-Galileo cooperation agreement marks a landmark in US-European cooperation on global navigation systems, while the June launch of the European High-Level Space Policy Group and concomitant development of a white paper on European Space Policy⁵ reinforce the need to promptly develop space-related strategic partnerships and address interoperability issues between members of the transatlantic alliance.

Genuine transatlantic cooperation in space, however, remains limited and space capabilities are not truly integrated into the transatlantic relationship. This is all the more troubling given the rapidly increasing proliferation of space capabilities. Scientific advances are making the required technology much more affordable. This has encouraged a number of non-state actors to enter the space business, including such diverse entities as the University of Surrey Space Center that develops and sells small satellites using primarily commercial, off-the-shelf technology, and individual billionaires such as Paul Allen, cofounder of Microsoft, whose recent and well-publicized success with SpaceShipOne has great implications for the future of commercial space flight. At such a moment of heightened interest and expansion, it is important that space-related issues be incorporated into the transatlantic relationship.

Space capabilities are inherently dual-use. However, the EU approach to space has thus far tended to focus on the civilian applications of space technologies and capabilities. In presenting their concept for a common EU policy on space, the authors of the EU white paper emphasized the potential of space to contribute to economic growth, job creation, industrial competitiveness, sustainable development, fighting poverty, and aiding

⁵ *Space: A New European Frontier for an Expanding Union: An Action Plan for Implementing the European Space Policy* (2003).

development. The ability to deploy effective space capabilities is also seen as something that will enhance the political standing of the EU.

Although they have generally focused on the civilian aspects of space, the EU white paper on space policy recognizes that “[s]pace has a security dimension and security has a space dimension.”⁶ As the Union further develops and refines its common security and defense policy it is becoming increasingly interested in the military uses of space. The European Commission has recently created a Space Security Group whose experts will advise the Commission about the use of space to enhance security.

Unlike the EU, the US has always focused heavily on the military potential of space technologies. This is particularly true of the current administration. The global War on Terror has provided additional motivation to continue exploring the military capabilities of existing technologies and to explore new ones. Space is a huge force multiplier and the potential contributions of space-based capabilities to the War on Terror are many. To provide just some examples: space-based assets have already transformed the conduct of war at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels; communication satellites are deployed in the service of public diplomacy to win hearts and minds; and space imagery is used to monitor potential WMD proliferators and can also be used for verification purposes in potential hotspots like Kashmir. As the global War on Terror progresses, it is certain that space will begin to play an increasingly important role.

It is inevitable that the EU’s growing interest in space will create the potential for transatlantic disagreement. This has already occurred in the case of Galileo, the European counterpart to the US Global Positioning Satellite (GPS) system. Position, navigation and timing systems such as GPS and Galileo have obvious dual use potential. This dual use potential and a dispute over the use of frequencies that the US intended for future military use, created a significant amount of tension. However, the recent

⁶ *Space: A New European Frontier for an Expanding Union: An Action Plan for Implementing the European Space Policy* (2003), 19.

agreement to make the two systems compatible and interoperable marks a major achievement in the transatlantic relationship.

Other areas of potential conflict are visible as well. The EU white paper on space recommends the EU build a strategic partnership with Russia, and Russia is also looking for a partner. Should it come to pass, such a partnership will likely cause some concern across the Atlantic. The structure of the EU, however, makes it difficult to negotiate with potential partners on a number of issues. Although initiatives are underway to bring a greater sense of cohesion and common purpose to the organization, the EU remains a fragmented. With 25 individual and sovereign states, it can be difficult to reach consensus on even the simplest of policies. Consequently, the implementation of the EU space policy and the search for strategic partnerships will likely be a lengthy process.

Like the EU space policy, the transatlantic relationship on space and space-related capabilities remains in its early, formative stages. As the EU space policy evolves and assumes a more definite character in the form of organizations, projects, and budgets, the transatlantic partners will find a growing number of opportunities for cooperation on space-related issues. The new strategic environment and the rapid proliferation of space capabilities suggest that the transatlantic partners would do well to take full advantage of such opportunities.

VII. CONCLUSION

The past year has been one of remarkable activity, achievement, and tension in the transatlantic relationship. NATO has expanded its membership while simultaneously transforming its command structure and developing new military capabilities more appropriate to the changed strategic environment. In the last several years NATO has accomplished more and experienced more change than at any other time in its history. Similarly, the EU has both “broadened” and “deepened”, by expanding its membership and developing a variety of policies and institutions to make it a more effective body on the global stage.

The transatlantic partnership has achieved remarkable progress in Afghanistan, as evidenced by the recent success of the first democratic elections in that country’s history. The transatlantic partners have also cooperated successfully on a number of law enforcement and intelligence issues critical to waging the global war on terrorism and are working together on a number of issues related to the proliferation of WMD.

Despite these successes, however, there are a number of issues that continue to divide the transatlantic partners. Disagreements persist over the most effective way to fight the global war on terrorism, with the US preferring a military approach targeting those groups and regimes that pose a clear and present danger, while the Europeans prefer to focus on law enforcement activities, and initiatives aimed at dealing with the “root causes” of terrorism. Similarly, the requirement to respond to potential threats expeditiously has on occasion prompted the US to adopt a unilateral approach to such threats, an approach that is at odds with Europe’s preference for multilateralism. Looming much larger than all of these disagreements, however, is Iraq. The fallout from the bitter diplomatic storms of the prewar period continues to poison the atmosphere of the transatlantic relationship.

As a result of these and other differences, the US image in Europe has fallen to its lowest point since the Vietnam War. A recent poll of 10,000 Europeans in 10 different countries

found that no less than 76% disapproved of current US foreign policy, up 12 points from 2003, and 20 points from 2002.⁷ It is likely that if Americans were polled on their views of Europe the result would be similar. Numbers such as these are troubling. For although the past year has seen many instances of productive transatlantic cooperation on a number of important issues, it is clear that much work remains to be done to change public (and official) attitudes, to rebuild a sense of trust and mutual respect, and to reestablish a sense of transatlantic community.

At the same time, it must be recognized that with the end of the Cold War and the beginning of a global war against terrorism, the strategic priorities of the US are changing. The US decision to reduce its military footprint in Europe and Asia by withdrawing some 70,000 troops and redeploying them to the continental United States is just one example of this change in priorities. With respect to its participation in NATO, the US's strategic vision is shifting southward. While continuing a policy of constructive cooperation with the former Soviet States of Eastern Europe, the US realizes that the long contest in which it now finds itself requires it to engage more actively with the Arab and Muslim states that occupy the southern Mediterranean and the Middle East.

Some have argued that this shift in focus could result in the marginalization of Europe. But this is not a foregone conclusion. Through a renewed focus on initiatives such as NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue and the recently announced Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, the transatlantic partnership will find new avenues for cooperation with countries like Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia. NATO should also try and forge a broader relationship with selected nations of the Greater Middle East, and seek out areas of consultation and cooperation with respect to issues of counter-terrorism, non-proliferation, and stability operations. Similarly, the transatlantic partners should work together to end the bloodshed between the Israelis and the Palestinians. A failure to resolve this longstanding conflict will have serious consequences for the wider region and will likely make it impossible for any new public

⁷ The poll was conducted by the German Marshall Fund.

diplomacy initiatives to succeed. A possible peacekeeping role for NATO forces in the region should not be discounted.

Finally, the transatlantic partners must realize that there are important opportunities for cooperation in the war of ideas. A chasm of understanding exists between the US and the broader Arab and Muslim world, while many European countries struggle to cope with large domestic Muslim populations that have yet to be integrated into European society. Perhaps the most important task facing the transatlantic partners is to find areas of cooperation that will help to bridge the cultural divide that separates the transatlantic West from the Muslim and Arab worlds, and to help win what promises to be the most important war of the new century, the war of ideas.

VIII. APPENDIX ONE: CONFERENCE AGENDA

THE FUTURE OF TRANSATLANTIC COOPERATION

Monday 20 – Friday 24 September 2004

MONDAY 20 SEPTEMBER

1830	DINNER	
2000	DINNER	GENERAL WELCOME AND INVITATION TO SEMINAR
	SPEECH	Thomas MOLINO , Vice President and Operations Manager, SAIC, McLean
<i>Guest Speaker Introduction:</i> Frank JENKINS , Senior Vice President and General Manager, Strategies Business Unit, SAIC, McLean		
<i>Guest Speaker:</i> Ian BRZEZINSKI , Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for European and NATO Policy, Washington DC		

TUESDAY 21 SEPTEMBER

0900-0915	GENERAL WELCOME	<i>Opening:</i> Thomas MOLINO , Vice President and Operations Manager, SAIC, McLean
0915-1230	SESSION 1	IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN: TRANSATLANTIC COOPERATION IN THE POST-WAR ENVIRONMENT NATO and NATO member countries continue to have important responsibilities in the post-war environments of Afghanistan and Iraq. These responsibilities have increased significantly following the decisions taken at the recent Istanbul Summit (June 2004). In Afghanistan, the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) will increase its presence throughout the country with the establishment of additional Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) while also providing increased support for upcoming elections. NATO member countries continue to support operations in Iraq and, following the Istanbul Summit, the Alliance has resolved to offer assistance to the government of Iraq in the training of its security forces. The outcome of post-war operations in these countries will have profound effects on the developmental trajectory of the region

and the future of the transatlantic partnership.

Chair: **Robert OSTERTHALER**, Vice President for Operations, SAIC, McLean

Panelists:

Karl-Heinz KAMP, Security Policy Coordinator, Konrad-Adenauer Foundation, Berlin

Christopher BENNETT, Editor, *NATO Review*, NATO HQ, Brussels

Jere VAN DYK, Author, Journalist and News Consultant, New York

1400-1730 SESSION 2

GLOBAL SECURITY COOPERATION AND NON-PROLIFERATION

Existing arms control, non-proliferation, and technology control regimes were designed in the context of a bipolar world characterised by US-Soviet rivalry. Since the end of the Cold War these regimes have been modified in small ways, but questions remain on a number of important issues such as the future of the nuclear testing moratorium, the role and deployment of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, differing approaches to non- and counter-proliferation, and the effectiveness of current practices in preventing non-state actors from acquiring weapons of mass destruction.

Chair:

Michael WHEELER, Director, Center for Nuclear History Studies, SAIC, McLean

Panelists:

Alexander PIKAYEV, Director, Department for Disarmament and Conflict Resolution, Institute of World Economy and International Relations, Moscow

Lene HOVE, Senior Adviser and Policy Planner, Office of the Personal Representative of the EU High Representative on Non-Proliferation of WMD, European Union, Brussels

Axel ANGELY, Deputy Director, Weapons of Mass Destruction Center, NATO, Brussels

WEDNESDAY 22 SEPTEMBER

0900-1230 SESSION 3

THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR: TRANSATLANTIC CHALLENGES AND TRANSATLANTIC COOPERATION

The Global War on Terror is not limited to current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Terrorist attacks in Spain and persistent threats against the United Kingdom, Italy and other European countries demonstrate the need for a unified, transatlantic approach to counterterrorism. Despite significant cooperation in the key areas of intelligence and law enforcement, however, there continues to be transatlantic disagreement about an appropriate strategy for dealing with the terrorist threat.

Chair:

Buzz KIEVENAAR, Vice President and Director, Center for European Security SAIC, McLean

Panelists:

Richard FROH, Head, Joint Armaments Section, NATO HQ, Brussels

Bruno TERTRAIS, Senior Research Fellow, Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, Paris

Simona COJOCARU, Head of the Evaluation and Analysis Office, Strategic Affairs Directorate, Ministry of National Defence, Bucharest

Michael STÜRMER, Chief Correspondent, *Die Welt*, Berlin

1900 DINNER *Dinner Speaker: Pierre LELLOUCHE*, Head, French Delegation to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly; Deputy, French National Assembly, Paris

THURSDAY 23 SEPTEMBER

0900-1230 SESSION 4 **THE FRONTIER OF SPACE: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE TRANSATLANTIC ALLIANCE**

In recent years, the medium of space has become an area of both cooperation and competition among the transatlantic partners. The recent signing of a GPS-Galileo cooperation agreement marks a landmark in US-European cooperation on global navigation systems, while the June launch of the European High-Level Space Policy Group and concomitant development of the “White Paper on European Space Policy” reinforce the need to promptly develop space-related strategic partnerships and address interoperability issues between members of the Transatlantic Alliance.

Chair:

Randall CORRELL, Project Director and Senior Scientist for the Integrated Resource Strategies Operation, SAIC, McLean

Panelists:

Eero AILIO, Coordinator, DG Energy and Transport (GALILEO) European Commission, Brussels

Hartwig BISCHOFF, Coordinator, Space Policy Unit, DG Research, European Commission, Brussels

Simon WORDEN, Congressional Fellow, Office of Senator Sam Brownback, US Senate, Washington DC; Research Professor of Astronomy, University of Arizona, Tucson

1400-1730 SESSION 5 **NATO AND THE EU: INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE TRANSATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP**

In April 2004, NATO admitted seven new members to the Alliance,

expanding the number of member countries from 19 to 26. This expansion promises to transform the internal dynamics of NATO. At the same time, perennial concerns about NATO's military capabilities remain unresolved. Similarly, the EU is currently experiencing a period of dramatic change and expansion. In May 2004, ten new countries joined the ranks of the EU and efforts are currently underway to expand EU military capabilities. Such dramatic institutional changes within NATO and the EU will have a significant impact on the character and dynamics of the transatlantic partnership.

Chair:

Robert BELL, Director, Brussels Operation, SAIC, Brussels

Panelists:

Stanley SLOAN, Director, Atlantic Community Initiative; Richmond

Helle DALE, Deputy Director, The Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Policy Studies, The Heritage Foundation, Washington DC

Irina ISAKOVA, Associate Fellow, Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies, London

1830 FOR CONFERENCE
1900 DINNER

Conference Summation:

Michael WHEELER, Director, Center for Nuclear History Studies, SAIC, McLean

IX. APPENDIX TWO: CONFERENCE PARTICIPANTS

Mr. Eero Ailio, Administrator, Galileo International Relations (Unit E4), Directorate E, Directorate-General for Energy and Transport, European Commission

Mr. Axel Angely, Deputy Head, WMDCIDPP, NATO Headquarters

Deputy State Secretary Jozsef Bali, Deputy State Secretary for Defense Policy, Hungarian Ministry of Defense

Mr. Toms Baumanis, Vice Chairman of the Board, Latvian Transatlantic Organization

Mr. Robert G. Bell, Director, Brussels Operation, Science Applications International Corporation

Mr. Chris Bennett, NATO Review Editor, NATO Headquarters

Mr. Hartwig Bischoff, , Directorate H - Space and Transport, Directorate-General for Research, European Commission

Mr. Tomas Bitinas, NATO Department, Senior Officer, Lithuanian Ministry of Defense

Mr Henrik Breitenbauch, Danish Institute for International Studies

Mr. Ian Brzezinski, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for European and NATO Affairs, Office of the Secretary of Defense

Dr. Stephen Calleya, Deputy Director, Mediterranean Academy of Diplomatic Studies, University of Malta

Ms. Simona Cojocaru, Head of Office, Directorate of Strategic Affairs, Department for Euro-Atlantic Integration and Defense Policy, Ministry of National Defence, Romania

Dr. Randal Correll, Project Director, Science Applications International Corporation

Dr. Helle Dale, Director of Foreign Policy and Defense Studies, and Deputy Director, The Heritage Foundation Davis Institute for International Policy Studies, Heritage Foundation

Colonel William Dean, Director, Development and Transformation, Space and Missile Systems Center (AFSPC), Los Angeles AFB

Lt Colonel Richard Einstman, Chief, Responsive Space Division, Space and Missile Systems Center (AFSPC), Los Angeles AFB

Mr. Rick Froh, Head, Joint Armaments Section, Armaments Director, Defence Investment Division, NATO Headquarters

Mr. Jonas Grinevicius, Head, NATO Division, Security Policy Department, Lithuanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Dr. David Hamon, Chief, Policy and Strategy Studies, Defense Threat Reduction Agency

Ms. Lene Hove, Senior Advisor, Office of the Personal Representative of the EU High Representative on Non-Proliferation of WMD

Dr. Irina Isakova, Associate Fellow, Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies

Mr. Frank Jenkins, Group Senior Vice President and General Manager, Strategies Business Unit, Science Applications International Corporation

Dr. Karl-Heinz Kamp, Security Policy Coordinator, Konrad-Adenauer-Foundation

Mr. Henry Kievenaar, Vice President, Science Applications International Corporation

Dr. William Krenz, Principal Director, The Aerospace Corporation

Mr. Pierre Lellouche, President of the French Delegation to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, French Delegation to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly

Ms. Kadri Liik, Editor, Journal Diplomaatia

Mr. Ahto Lobjakas, Research Associate, Estonian Foreign Policy Institute

Mr. Roy McCullough, Military Historian & Project Manager, Science Applications International Corporation

Dr. Robert McGeehan, Associate Fellow, America's Programme, Royal Institute of International Affairs

Mr. Thomas Molino, Vice President & Operations Manager, Science Applications International Corporation

Mr. William Norris, Group Manager, Sandia National Laboratories

Mr. Robert Osterthaler, Vice President for Operations, Science Applications International Corporation

Dr. Alexander Pikayev, Director, Department for Disarmament and Conflict Resolution, Institute of World Economy and International Relations

Secretary Edgars Rinkevics, Secretary of State for Defence, Ministry of Defense of Latvia

Dr. Velizar Shalamanov, Advisor on National Security & Defense, Center for National Security & Defense Research, Bulgarian Academy of Sciences

Ambassador Matjaz Sinkovec, Permanent Representative of the Republic of Slovenia to NATO, Permanent Mission of the Republic of Slovenia to NATO

Mr. Stan Sloan, Director, Atlantic Community Initiative

Dr. Michael Stuermer, Chief Correspondent, Die Welt

Dr. Bruno Tertrais, Senior Research Fellow, Fondation pour la Recherche Strategique

Mr. Jere Van Dyk, Author, Journalist and South Asia Consultant

Dr. Alan Weston, Chief Scientist, Space and Missile Systems Center (AFSPC), Los Angeles AFB

Dr. Mike Wheeler, Senior Defense Analyst, Science Applications International Corporation

COL Stephen Wilkins, Division Chief, Army Multinational Strategy and Programs

Brigadier General (ret.) Simon Worden, Congressional Fellow, Office of Senator Sam Brownback, United States Senate

Mrs. Barbara Zvokelj, Political Advisor, Permanent Mission of the Republic of Slovenia to NATO